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Incident investigation is important and complex. Its purpose is to uncover the truth about an 
incident, and thus the investigation must be independent, objective, scientific and transparent. 
In addition, the independence of the investigative body must be fully recognized under the law, 
and the investigative body must be composed of professionals. The investigation procedures 
need to be scientific and rigorous, and the investigation process and the conclusions of the 
investigation should be made public. This paper uses the "7.23" accident investigation as a case 
study. Through a comparative analysis, the paper reveals existing flaws in the process of 
incident investigation in China, including a lack of independent administrative investigative 
bodies, a lack of legal recognition of the independence of investigative bodies, outdated 
investigation procedures, failure to uphold the public's right to a transparent investigation, and 
failure to consider prevention of future accidents during investigations.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At 20:30:05 on July 23, 2011, a rear-end accident occurred that involved the D301 bullet train 
bound for Fuzhou station from Beijingnan Railway Station and the D3115 train bound for 
Fuzhounan Station from Hangzhou Station along the "Yongwen Line" in Wenzhou, Zhejiang. 
Forty people were killed, and 172 people were injured.1 The accident is known as the "major 
7.23 Yongwen Line railway accident" (hereafter referred to as the "7.23 accident").  
The 7.23 accident is one example of the many types of accidents that have occurred in China. 
The last three years have seen numerous major accidents. Take the traffic accident as an 
example, the basic statistics of traffic accident can be seen in table 1. Analyzing the data, we 
can find that the number of accident, deaths of accident, injuries of accident and direct 
pecuniary losses of accident still keep in a high level.  
Table 1. Basic Statistics on Traffic Accident (2010~2012) 
  Indicators 2010 2011 2012* 
 Major Traffic  
Accident 
Number of Major 
 Accident (case) 
58244 54704 24 
Deaths of Major  
Accident(person) 
65225 62387 325 
Injuries of Major 
 Accident(person) 
33964 31420 364 
Direct Pecuniary Losses of  
Major Accident 
(10000 yuan) 
43925.4 52383 262.8 
Total of Traffic  
Accident 
Number of Accident (case) 219521 210812 204196 
Deaths (person) 65225 62387 59997 
Injuries (person) 254075 237421 224327 
Direct Pecuniary Losses  
(10000 yuan) 
92633.5 107873 117489.6 
Note: The data comes from China Statistical Yearbook. 
*According to Byelaw governing reporting, investigation and handing of production safety accidents (An 
order by PRC State Council), the criterion of major accident and serious accident has changed in 2012.  
These startling statistics have led people to wonder why such accidents happen repeatedly and 
why China has not learned how to prevent similar tragedies. The cause is that after paying the 
high price of an incident we often miss the opportunity to learn from it (Kletz, 2002). So the 
incident should be learned not only for present purposes but for the future occasions where they 
might be relevant (Bond, 2002). 
Incident investigation helps reveal the causes of an accident and promotes learning that can 
prevent future accidents. After the 7.23 accident, the accident investigation drew widespread 
                                                        
1 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation Report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
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attention and controversy driven by social media, which exposed flaws in the process of 
incident investigation in China. Using a summary and analysis of the principles and legal basis 
behind the 7.23 accident investigation, the investigative body, and the investigation procedures, 
this paper identifies flaws in the incident investigation process. These flaws include the lack of 
an independent investigative body, an unsound legal system, outdated investigation procedures, 
a lack of transparency in the investigation, and an over-emphasis on responsibility and 
accountability rather than accident prevention.  
2. PRINCIPLES OF INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Independence. Incident investigation is a process to uncover the true story of an incident. 
However, when incidents involve governmental units or large companies, the investigative 
body responsible for the investigation will face pressure from lobbyists or even the 
governmental body or companies involved, making it difficult to carry out an effective 
investigation. To avoid external influence on the investigative body, the investigation must 
adhere to the principle of independence. This is the first principle of incident investigation.  
Objectivity. Effective incident investigation requires the investigative body to strive to seek the 
truth and assume a neutral position to determine the true cause of the accident in an objective 
and impartial manner. Some investigations require logical reasoning, simulations, or 
calculations, but subjective judgment by the participating investigators should be avoided, and 
all conclusions should be based on a scientific methodology.  
Scientific process. The investigation of major accidents is especially complex and difficult, 
and it requires specialized investigators with appropriate knowledge, skills, and understanding 
of scientific methods and standardized investigation procedures. These criteria allow the 
conclusions of the investigation to stand the test of time and be acceptable to the public.  
Transparency. During an investigation, press conferences, hearings, incident reports, and other 
methods should be utilized to respond to the public's questions and concerns so that the public 
can follow the progress of the investigation. Once the investigation is complete, the 
investigation report should be made public (with the exception of any confidential information) 
so that the public can learn about what caused the accident and how it occurred. This type of 
transparency also helps researchers have better access to information for further in-depth 
studies.  
3. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
To ensure the independence of the investigative body, this body needs to be legally recognized. 
Without a legal determination of the independence of the investigative body, it is difficult for 
the investigation to produce credible results. For example, the United States of America (U.S.) 
has a legal process for ensuring the independence of the investigative body during 
transportation accident investigations.  
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The U.S. passed the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 because Congress realized 
that the executive branch would often interfere with the accident investigations and conclusions 
of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Therefore, it was deemed necessary to 
pass the Independent Safety Board Act to strengthen the independence and investigative 
authority of the NTSB. The NTSB became truly independent on April 1, 1975, when the 
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 went into effect. This Act stipulates that the NTSB will 
independently investigate the cause of all transportation accidents, issue investigation reports, 
and actively engage in transportation safety and accident prevention.2 
4. INVESTIGATIVE BODY 
To ensure that the investigative body provides a credible investigation report, it must be 
ensured that the body is independent and free from interference by external pressures. Second, 
the investigative body must include professional and scientific personnel that provide security 
and technical support. In transportation accident investigations in the U.S., the government 
focuses on establishing an independent and professional investigative body.  
The U.S. NTSB was founded in 1967 under the Ministry of Transportation. Prior to the 
founding of the NTSB, incident investigations faced issues with discrepant marine, railway, and 
aviation regulations; insufficient investigatory authority; a lack of sufficiently independent 
investigative bodies; and staff shortages. In 1974, Congress passed the Independent Safety 
Board Act, which made the NTSB an independent institution that was not affiliated with any 
branch of the federal government. The NTSB has five board members, each nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate to serve 5-year terms (fig.1). No more than 3 of the 5 
members can come from the same political party, and the members cannot be removed for 
political reasons or because of unpopular decisions. This regulation ensures the independence 
of the board. The purpose of the Act was to ensure that NTSB investigations were 
evidence-based while minimizing political influence. In terms of professional background, 3 of 
the 5 members must be experts holding specific expertise and technical qualifications. 
Moreover, there are separate units of the board, including engineering, aviation, marine, 
highway, and railway, to provide professional and personnel support for investigations. In total, 
there are more than 400 staff members providing expertise for incident investigations and 
prevention (Eric Fielding, Andrew W. Lo, and Jian Helen Yang 2010).  
                                                        
2 Refer to the history and organizational introduction of the National Transportation Safety Board. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ntsb.gov/about/history.html 





Fig.1. The Organization, Investigative body and Investigative Procedures of the NTSB 
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5.   INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) describes incident investigation as a 
procedure to determine how and why failures occur that result in personal injury or property 
damage. Incident investigations need to follow certain procedures to be scientific and 
standardized. There are many incident investigation procedures in existence, for example, 
OSHA’s 3steps4, Incident Response Process (Chris Prosise & Kevin Mandia, 2001), etc. 
According to Ian S. Sutton (2010), incident investigations should follow the following six 
steps.  
 
  Fig.2. Sutton model of incident investigations 
Preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation should be conducted at the time of the 
emergency response to the accident. In addition to recording the time, location, process, actions 
taken, casualties, and property losses associated with the accident, the most important aspect is 
to collect evidence and preserve any evidence that is prone to disappearing over time. The first 
step is to gather witness testimonies. People directly involved in the accident are key witnesses, 
and investigators should identify eyewitnesses and conduct timely depositions because some 
witnesses will forget details or provide false evidence later. The second step is to gather 
physical evidence, which includes equipment and hardware debris that are associated with the 
scene of the accident. Prior to processing these items, photographs should be taken at the scene 
                                                        
4 OSHA Standards, retrieved from: 
https://www.osha.gov/dte/grant_materials/fy10/sh-20843-10/cscb_accidentinvestigation.ppt  
Preliminary investigation 
Establish an incident investigation team 
Collect evidence 
Construct a chart of the accident timeline 
Identify the cause 
Submit a report and recommendations 
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as evidence to be used later in the investigation. The third step is to collect archival evidence, 
such as documents and electronic data, related to the accident.  
Establish an incident investigation team. After the accident, a special investigation team 
should be established to investigate the cause of the accident. The success of the investigation 
is closely related to the nature of the investigation team, as the independence, professionalism, 
techniques, and experience of the investigation team determine the quality of the investigation. 
Stakeholders in the incident cannot serve as members of the investigation team, and the 
authorities involved in the incident should not usually be directly involved in the investigation, 
but must cooperate with the investigation team and help collect data.  
Collect evidence. Once the investigation team is established, the team should collect a large 
amount of evidence and establish an evidence database. In addition to interviews with 
witnesses, the team should pay close attention to the collection of physical evidence because 
physical evidence is objective and not easily altered. Physical evidence can generally be 
divided into evidence at the scene and evidence gathered through simulation experiments. 
Various documents and records should also be collected.  
Construct a chart of the accident timeline. A chart of the accident timeline can be 
constructed that includes three stages: pre-accident, accident, and post-accident. The main goal 
of the pre-accident stage is to reconstruct the background of the accident. The goal of the 
accident stage is to reconstruct the scene of the accident with a focus on analyzing the chain of 
reactions between events. The post-accident stage focuses on the emergency response because 
an appropriate response will reduce the losses caused by an accident.  
Identify the cause. The analysis of the cause of an accident should be based on credible 
witnesses and physical evidence, not just guesswork and imagination. Various analyses, 
technical appraisals, and experimental simulations must be used to uncover the truth of the 
accident and determine the cause of the accident in a way that can stand the test of time.  
Submit a report and recommendations. This report usually covers the nature of the accident, 
the process of the accident, the cause and consequences of the accident, lessons learned, and 
recommendations for improvement. Additionally, the report should include information about 
the investigation methods and process, all accident-related background information, technical 
appraisals and experimental simulation data, and other supporting evidence in an appendix to 
support the conclusions of the investigation. 
6. FLAWS IN CHINA'S 7.23 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
After the 7.23 accident, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao declared that the cause of 
the accident must be identified as soon as possible. On July 25, the State Council 7.23 accident 
investigation team was established. On July 27, the State Council held an executive meeting to 
discuss the accident investigation. On July 28, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed clear 
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requirements for the investigation, emphasizing that the investigation team should reach 
conclusions that could stand throughout history.5 Under the immense pressure of public 
opinion, the central government attached great importance to the investigation. Overall, the 
investigation was the highest-quality, most transparent investigation that had occurred in China 
for many years. Nonetheless, an analysis of the investigation revealed flaws in China's incident 
investigation process. Comparing with the U.S. NTSB, we can find these flaws. 
Table 2. Comparisons of incident investigation between China and the U.S. 
Indicators Chinese incident investigation 
Incident investigation of 
the U.S. NTSB 
Principle of incident 
investigation 
Limit the information.  
Lack of  transparency. 
The important 
information is open to 
public through many 
ways, like web and 
hearing meetings. 
Investigative body 
Lake of an independent 
investigative body. 
NTSB is an independent 
investigation, which 
subjects to congressional 
hearings and questioning. 
Legal basis for 
incident 
investigations 
There is no lack of laws related 
to incident investigation in 
China. 
Lack of a legal basis for 
incident investigations. 




Investigation procedure is not 
sound, like evidence collecting,  
experts' judgments and team 
technique so on. 
China's incident investigation 
model. 
NTSB has investigative 
standards and good 
investigative steps. 
Result of incident 
investigation 
Over-emphasis on 
responsibility and failure to 
address accident prevention 
during the investigation. 
Keep the investigative 
result objectively through 
investigative hearing. 
Provide the safety 
recommendations.  
 
7. LACK OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE BODY  
According to the regulations of China's "production safety incident reporting and investigation 
act," major accidents are investigated by an investigation team organized by the State Council 
or by relevant units authorized by the State Council.6 The investigation of major accidents, 
                                                        
5 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation Report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
6 According to China's "production safety incident reporting and investigation act," Article 3, “major accidents” 
refers to accidents with more than 30 deaths, more than 100 serious injuries, or more than 100 million yuan in 
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serious accidents, and general accidents is the responsibility of the provincial government, 
municipal government, and county government, respectively. According to the specific 
circumstances of the accident, the investigation team is composed of designated personnel from 
relevant government units, production safety supervision and management units, the 
supervisory authority, the public security authorities, and the union. The procuratorate is also 
invited to participate. The investigation team can also hire experts to participate in the 
investigation. The jurisdictional safety production supervision and management unit (at the 
state level, this is the State Administration of Production Safety Supervision and Management; 
at the local level, this is the provincial, municipal, or county Administration of Production 
Safety Supervision and Management) is responsible for carrying out the operations of the 
investigation. The unit forms a temporary investigation team with other relevant government 
units and experts to conduct the investigation on behalf of the government. 
The investigation of the 7.23 accident clearly exposed the issue of the lack of an independent 
investigative body. On July 25, the State Council approved the establishment of the 
investigation team led by Luo Lin from the State Administration of Production Safety 
Supervision and Management. The team comprised 14 personnel and 8 experts from other 
major relevant administrative units, for a total of 23 people. However, Vice Minister Peng 
Kaiyu was the deputy director of the investigation team, and the Secretary of the Ministry of 
Railways Safety Supervision, Chen Lanhua, was a member of the investigation team. The 
Ministry of Railways was the supervision and management unit for the safe operation of 
railway transportation and was the primary stakeholder in the 7.23 accident. With the Vice 
Minister and the Secretary of the Ministry of Railways as deputy director and member, 
respectively, of the investigation team, the judgment of other members could have been unduly 
influenced. It was possible that other members would shirk their responsibility, thereby 
affecting the impartiality of the investigation. This situation aroused intense questioning and 
dissatisfaction on the part of the public. Under pressure from public opinion, on August 10, the 
State Council was forced to change the members of the investigation team. The Council 
removed Peng Kaiyu and Chen Lanhua from their posts to increase the independence of the 
team and the credibility of the investigation.7 
The lack of an independent investigative body was also reflected in the fact that the 
investigation was led by a non-independent administrative unit. The Chinese system is designed 
such that the State Council is China's highest administrative body and is indirectly responsible 
for the supervision and management of all accidents in China. The State Administration of 
Production Safety Supervision and Management is below the State Council and has the direct 
                                                                                                                                    
direct economic losses. “Serious accidents” refers to accidents with 10-30 deaths, 50-100 serious injuries, or 
50-100 million yuan in direct economic losses. 
7 The State Council decided to adjust the members of the 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident 
Investigation Team and Expert Panel (August 11, 2011), People’s Daily. Retrieved from: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/15387051.html 
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power of administrative enforcement over all levels of accident supervision and management 
authorities, and therefore shoulders the greatest supervision and management responsibility for 
accidents in China. Essentially, the State Administration of Production Safety Supervision and 
Management (or the Local Administration of Production Safety Supervision and Management) 
is the direct stakeholder in these accidents. However, the investigations are entrusted by the 
State Council or local governments to the Administration of Production Safety Supervision and 
Management, which represents the same level of government as the State Administration of 
Production Safety Supervision and Management. In addition, Chinese administrative units are 
not subject to congressional controls. Compared to the U.S.’s NTSB, which is independent and 
subject to congressional hearings and questioning, China's investigative authorities are 
non-independent administrative units that are the direct stakeholders in accidents, making it 
difficult to prevent interference with the investigation by state or local leaders.  
During the 7.23 accident investigation, some researchers questioned the independence of the 
investigative body. China has no independent body for incident investigations, but the National 
People's Congress can establish a "special investigation committee" to be responsible for an 
investigation so that the investigation is free from the influence of executive power.8 In fact, in 
China's current constitution (1982), Article 71 makes the following provisions for the 
establishment of special investigation committees: "The National People's Congress and its 
Standing Committee can organize investigation committees on specific issues when deemed 
necessary and make corresponding resolutions according to the committee report. During the 
investigation, all the relevant state organs, social organizations and citizens are obligated to 
provide the necessary materials." Unfortunately, however, in the past 30 years, the Special 
Investigation Committee clause has never been used, and as a result, Article 71 has become 
useless. In China's political system, not only is the constitution often put on the back shelf, but 
the highest authority (the National People's Congress) is known as a "rubber stamp." In the 
foreseeable future, China will continue to use the existing system of incident investigation. 
Given the lack of independent investigative bodies, there is major concern whether China’s 
accident investigations can uncover the truth.  
8. LACK OF A LEGAL BASIS FOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS  
There is no lack of laws related to incident investigation in China. Since the 1980s, the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has successively developed the 
"Maritime Transportation Safety Law," "Railway Law," "Civil Aviation Law," "Road 
Transportation Safety Law," "Production Safety Law," and others, and all of these laws address 
incident investigation. However, there are discrepancies in these laws in terms of the 
                                                        
8 A Peking University professor called for the urgent establishment of a Special Committee to investigate the truth 
of the rear-end accident (July 27, 2011), the Beijing Evening News, retrieved from: 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/07-27/3213855.shtml 
Volume 10, No. 3 
46 
investigative body, investigation procedures, and responsibilities, with overlapping functions 
that result in confusion during the actual implementation of investigations. In 2007, to better 
regulate the incident investigation process and prevent and reduce accidents according to the 
"Production Safety Law" and other laws, China developed a more detailed "production safety 
incident reporting and investigation act" that to some extent solved the issues of multiple 
overlapping laws and implementation problems. The 7.23 accident investigation was largely 
conducted according to this "production safety incident reporting and investigation act."9 
However, the laws are flawed. First, the government authority that developed the law did not 
have sufficient authority, especially compared to the U.S. Independent Safety Board Act 
developed by the U.S. Congress. The legal basis for incident investigation in China, the 
"production safety incident reporting and investigation act," was promulgated by an 
administrative unit of the State Council that has a relatively low level of authority. Second, the 
establishment of an independent investigative body is not clearly defined in the law. For 
example, according to the principle of "unified leadership by the government with graded 
responsibilities" of the "production safety incident reporting and investigation act," the 
investigative body should be established at the county level or above, depending on the level of 
the accident. However, in many cases, the government authorities or units are directly or 
indirectly responsible for the accident. Therefore, this model is not conducive to creating 
impartiality in the accident investigation. An investigation led by a non-independent 
administrative unit is precisely what should be avoided. The lack of recognition of independent 
investigative bodies in China's law leads to a lack of independence in incident investigations. If 
the current model is not transformed into a model in which an investigative body is authorized 
by the National People's Congress and the law10 or an independent third-party investigation 
institution is established based on the law, China will continue to face questioning due to the 
lack of independent investigative bodies.  
9. INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES  
                                                        
9 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation Report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
10 Although the Constitution stipulates that the National People's Congress can organize investigative committees 
on specific issues when necessary, this is only an exception for special circumstances and has never been 
implemented. Other than the provisions in the Constitution, there are no legal provisions by the National People's 
Congress regarding an independent incident investigation team. In fact, my personal view is that, unlike the 
political system with separation of powers in the United States, under the current one-party political system in 
China, the National People's Congress is subject to the leadership and controls of Chinese Communist Party and is 
unlikely to enact laws to establish independent investigative bodies. Moreover, even if the National People's 
Congress enacts laws to establish independent investigative bodies, the practical effects are also questionable, 
because if it is difficult to enforce the Constitution, it will certainly be more difficult to enforce general laws. Of 
course, under China's current system, the establishment of an independent investigative body is still great progress, 
and at least it is a first step towards an effective investigation. 
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Incident investigation procedures largely determine the procedural justice of investigation and 
affect the credibility of the conclusions. In terms of investigation procedures, the preliminary 
investigation is very important because some evidence is prone to disappearance or intentional 
destruction, so evidence must be collected at the time of the emergency response. The purpose 
of preliminary investigations is to collect physical evidence and witness testimonies as soon as 
possible to provide a basis for the future formal incident investigation.  
The 7.23 accident investigation procedures, especially with regards to the preliminary 
investigation, were quite flawed. On the morning after the accident, the Ministry of Railways 
began dismantling cars and burying the locomotive. In such a major accident, any remaining 
objects were undoubtedly very valuable physical evidence; in particular, the damaged 
locomotive was a key piece of physical evidence for the accident investigation. The act of 
burying the locomotive provoked intense public doubt and anger stemming from the belief that 
the Ministry of Railways was destroying evidence and shirking its responsibility. In addition, 
prior to dismantling the cars and burying the locomotive, the Ministry of Railways claimed to 
have observed no signs of life, but a little girl just over 2 years in age was later rescued from a 
damaged car, which further angered the Chinese public. On July 26, the State Department had 
to yield to the immense pressure from the public and dig out the locomotive and cars to be used 
as evidence in the investigation.  
Furthermore, Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang rushed to the scene on the morning of July 24 to 
direct the rescue and take responsibility for the accident investigation.11 In reality, however, 
there was no preliminary investigation and no protection of evidence at the scene of the 
accident. The explanation from the Ministry of Railways regarding dismantling the cars and 
burying the locomotive was that they wanted to resume transportation as soon as possible and 
that their act was conducive to rescue, but this explanation was not credible. The destruction of 
key evidence exposed the flaws in China's incident investigation procedures. If the locomotive 
had not been dug out due to pressure from the public, the most important piece of evidence 
would have been missing from the accident investigation. In that case, how would it be possible 
to conduct a scientific evidence-based accident investigation? The behavior of the Ministry also 
exposed the problem of not having laws in place to establish an independent investigative body. 
What prompted the Ministry of Railways to bury the cars in such a hurry after the accident? 
Who made the decision to bury the cars? Even the final investigation report from the State 
Council accident investigation team did not provide a clear answer to these questions.  
The role of experts is very important for investigation procedures because experts can provide 
expertise and judgment during the scientific investigation. However, the experts involved in the 
accident investigation in China were all temporarily selected from other units of government. 
                                                        
11 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
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During the 7.23 accident investigation, the deputy director of the investigation team was an 
expert who should have played an important role in the investigation, but he was busy with 
other tasks and did not participate in the entire accident investigation; thus, he did not clearly 
understand the relevant information.12 Given that the deputy director of the expert panel was 
not focused on the identifying the cause of the accident during the investigation, how could the 
final conclusions of the investigation be credible?  
10. TRANSPARENCY OF THE INVESTIGATION 
The right to information is a fundamental right of citizens, and citizens' concerns and questions 
about an accident should not be avoided. The progress of the investigation and information 
about the accident should be publicized in a timely manner. Due to the rise of social media in 
China, the 7.23 accident investigation was conducted under the spotlight of the public. On 
December 28, 2011, the State Administration of Production Safety Supervision and 
Management published the 7.23 accident investigation report on its website, which included six 
parts: the basic situation, the process of the accident, the emergency response, the nature and 
causes of the accident, recommendations for disciplinary actions for the personnel and 
governmental units responsible for the accident, and recommendations for corrective measures 
for accident prevention.  
Based on the content of the published report, the 7.23 accident investigation report was an 
improvement over previous investigations, but the report still lacked accident-related technical 
appraisal data and other evidence to support the conclusions of the investigation.13  
The 7.23 accident investigation was conducted under the pressure of strong public opinion, and 
the investigation team was obliged to publish the content of the investigation report. In China, 
the investigation reports of many previous major accidents have not been published, such as the 
report from the major Jiaoji Railway transportation accident on April 28, 2008, which resulted 
in 72 deaths, 416 injuries, and a direct economic loss of 41.92 million yuan; and the major fire 
accident in Shanghai on November 15, 2010, which caused 58 deaths and 71 injuries. For both 
accidents, the State Council established an investigation team similar to the 7.23 accident 
investigation team, but the teams did not release the details of the investigation reports and did 
not even release the basic content and results of the investigations. The State Administration of 
Production Safety Supervision and Management published only the recommendations of 
penalties for personnel responsible for the accident on its website.14 Since entering the era of 
                                                        
12 Lidan He (November 28, 2011), Wang Mengshu under the spotlight, Xinmin Weekly, retrieved from: 
http://weekly.news365.com.cn/sh/201111/t20111129_3192426.htm 
13 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation Report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
14 The State Council dealt with 5 major safety accidents (May 26, 2009), retrieved from: 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-05/26/content_1325399.htm 
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new media in recent years, social media has been very active in China. Public demand for the 
truth about the 7.23 accident was expressed via social media outlets (Xiaowen Xu 2011), 
forcing the government to demonstrate its progress in releasing the content of the 7.23 accident 
investigation report. However, there is still much room for improvement in terms of the 
transparency of incident investigations in China. For example, there is typically a long time 
interval from the beginning to the completion of an investigation. If the content and conclusions 
of the accident investigation are only released after the completion of the investigation, the 
victims' families and the public will be troubled by questions during the investigation because 
they do not have access to information about the progress of the investigation. Therefore, 
accurate information about the procedures and progress of the different stages of the accident 
investigation should be continuously communicated to the victims' families and the public at 
the beginning, interim, and completion stages of an investigation. In addition, the content of the 
investigation should be released via press conferences, hearings, and other media channels to 
respond to the concerns of the victims' families and the public. As an example, the U.S. NTSB 
board meetings are open to the public, and the public has access to information about the 
progress of incident investigations on the NTSB website. Moreover, the NTSB board holds 
public hearings to increase transparency and allow the public to learn more about the progress 
of the investigation. The 7.23 accident investigation was not well executed in this regard. 
During the investigation, the investigation team did not release accurate and useful information 
to the victims' families and the public, which resulted in questions on the part of the public 
about the accident investigation process. In fact, only by increasing the openness of the 
accident investigation will it be possible to have positive interaction between the victims' 
families, the public, and the investigative body; build a higher level of trust between the public 
and the government; and promote a smooth completion of the accident investigation.  
11. OVER-EMPHASIS ON RESPONSIBILITY AND FAILURE TO 
ADDRESS ACCIDENT PREVENTION DURING THE INVESTIGATION 
In the final report of the 7.23 accident investigation, in addition to providing an analysis of the 
causes of the accident and a set of proposed improvements, the report also identified certain 
governmental units as being responsible for the accident and recommended penalties for 54 
people.15 China's "production safety accident reporting and investigation act” stipulates that 
incident investigations should promptly and accurately identify the process of accident, the 
cause of accident, and the loss caused by accident; summarize lessons from the accident; 
                                                                                                                                    
The list of 54 responsible personnel penalized for the "11.15” major fire accident in Shanghai (June 10, 2011), 
retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/0610/134117/content_134117.htm 
15 7.23 Yongwen Line Major Railway Accident Investigation Report of the State Council 7.23 Yongwen Line 
Major Railway Accident Investigation Team (December 25, 2011), retrieved from 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/Contents/Channel_5498/2011/1228/160577/content_160577.htm 
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identify those responsible for the accident; propose recommendations of penalties for those 
responsible for the accident; identify the administrative responsibility of those responsible for 
the accident; and pursue criminal charges against those suspected of a crime. Therefore, China's 
incident investigation model combines the technical investigation with an administrative 
accountability investigation (and even judicial investigation). Sometimes accidents are related 
to the misconduct of certain parties, and it is necessary to hold those parties accountable. 
However, with a model that combines the technical investigation of an accident with the pursuit 
of administrative accountability, there is too much emphasis placed on accountability, and the 
accident investigation and the pursuit of accountability can become intertwined. Holding 
parties accountable may even become the ultimate goal of the investigation. The published 
results of major accident investigations since 2008 on the State Administration of Production 
Safety Supervision and Management website show that assigning responsibility to relevant 
personnel has been the focus of published investigation conclusions and that conclusions are 
often provided with very few detailed recommendations for the prevention of future 
accidents.16 
There are many reasons for the over-emphasis on accountability and the failure to address 
prevention (based on technical investigations) in China's incident investigations. The first 
reason is a lack of professional expertise on the investigation teams. According to the 
provisions of the "production safety incident reporting and investigation act," an investigation 
team should be designed to be streamlined and efficient, and an investigation team can hire 
experts to participate in the investigation. In many cases, the investigation team is mainly 
composed of various government officials and experts who participate passively. The experts 
have no opportunity to participate in the investigation unless they are invited, and even when 
experts participate in an investigation, they are temporarily selected from other units of 
government. This means that the technical expertise of the investigation team is limited to a 
few members, with the majority of members being government officials who lack expertise. 
The second reason is an insufficient period of time for conducting the investigation. The 
"production safety accident reporting and investigation act" stipulates that an investigation team 
must submit its investigation report within 60 days of the accident. Under special circumstances, 
the deadline to submit the accident investigation report may be extended by up to 60 days. The 
governmental branch responsible for the investigation must respond within 15 days of receipt 
of the investigation report, and for major accidents, the government must respond within 30 
days. Under special circumstances, the deadline for governmental response may be extended 
for up to 30 days. This means that under special circumstances, the investigation team has a 
maximum period of 4 months to submit an investigation report, while under normal 
circumstances, the team must submit an investigation report within 2 months. This timeline is 
                                                        
16 Refer to the published content of the major accident investigations from the State Administration of Production 
Safety Supervision and Management, retrieved from: 
http://www.chinasafety.gov.cn/newpage/zwgk/tdsgdccl/zwgk_tdsgdccl_lm.htm 
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very tight for a major accident investigation, making it difficult to conduct a precise technical 
investigation. The third reason for the emphasis on accountability is the intention to quell 
public discontent. At the time of a major accident, the public is very concerned about the 
accident and, due to their limited expertise and emotional state, the general public is mostly 
concerned about which government officials will be held accountable. Holding personnel 
accountable for the accident is the most efficient way for the Chinese government to quickly 
appease public discontent. In addition, because the investigation team is mostly composed of 
government officials, they are often more concerned with attributing responsibility for the 
accident than with uncovering the cause of the accident.  
Therefore, China's incident investigations are often dominated by assigning accountability, 
while ignoring the technical investigation and the fact that the ultimate goal of an incident 
investigation is to identify the cause of the accident, learn from it, and propose corrective 
measures to prevent similar accidents from happening again.17 Perhaps this situation explains 
why many types of major accidents frequently happen in China, yet there is no effective 
solution. If incident investigations focus too much on holding responsible parties accountable, 
rather than conducting a proper technical investigation, it is difficult to prevent similar 
accidents from happening in the future.  
12. CONCLUSION 
Having an independent investigative body is key to effective incident investigation because 
only when the investigative body is independent will it to be able to uncover the truth about an 
accident. There are many flaws in China's current system of incident investigation. Specifically, 
there is no legal recognition of independent investigative bodies; investigation procedures are 
neither scientific nor rigorous; the transparency of investigations is not sufficient to meet the 
public's rights to know; and the investigations focus too much on holding responsible parties 
accountable, while ignoring accident prevention. It is difficult for this type of incident 
investigation to uncover the real cause of an accident, learn from it, and propose effective 
recommendations for the prevention of future accidents.  
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